While specificity is typically a good thing in contract drafting, sometimes, too much specificity can backfire. A commercial landlord in Boston discovered this recently when the Suffolk County Superior Court discharged rent otherwise owed by a cafe operator during the period when the Governor had issued an emergency order banning on-premises consumption of food and drink. Interestingly, the case was filed not by the tenant, but by the landlord, who was seeking payment of back rent, eviction of the tenant due to default, and attorney’s fees. In fact, the tenant had already quit the premises after receiving an eviction notice.

The lease at issue expressly limited the tenant to using the premises to operate a “Caffé Nero themed cafe,” and not for any other purpose. Because the tenant’s café business was effectively shut down for several months by an executive order barring indoor or outdoor service of food and drink in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court found that the “frustration of purpose” doctrine excused the tenant from its obligation to pay rent during the period of that executive order.

The court cited to a 1991 decision by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) which held that the “frustration of purpose” doctrine excuses a party to a lease or other contract from performing its contractual obligations “when an event neither anticipated nor caused by either party, the risk of which was not allocated by the contract, destroys the object or purpose of the contract, thus destroying the value of performance.” The court further noted that “[n]either the force majeure provision (which addresses impossibility but not frustration of purpose) nor the independent covenant provision bars this defense.”

While it is anticipated that this decision will be appealed, it was issued by a well-respected jurist of the Business Litigation Section of the Suffolk County Superior Court, and was directly tied to prior SJC case law. As such, many commercial tenants whose businesses were shut down by executive order may find that their obligation to pay rent for that period is excused. Moreover, since the “frustration of purpose” doctrine is not unique to Massachusetts, it should be expected that this issue will continue to be litigated for some time to come. For more information, please contact PLDO Partner Joel K. Goloskie at 866-353-3310 or email jgoloskie@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice

Employers in the four easternmost New England states should be aware of recent case law that may radically impact their obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Federal courts in those states are subject to the guidance of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which recently issued a decision in an ADA case that represented a significant departure from the prior decisions of not just every other Circuit Court, but of the First Circuit itself.

In Bell v. O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC, the First Circuit addressed a store manager’s claim that his employer denied him a reasonable accommodation. The manager’s doctor provided a return-to-work clearance which stated that, because of the manager’s mental health issues, he should not be scheduled for more than 9 hours per day, 5 days per week: a total of 45 scheduled hours. The store’s policy, however, was that managers would be scheduled for 50 hours per week, and needed to be flexible for up to an additional 50 hours per week.

In overturning the District Court of Maine, which instructed the jury that the manager must prove that he “needed” an accommodation to perform the essential functions of his job, the First Circuit held that:

The District Court erred here when it instructed the jury that, for a disabled employee to make out a failure-to-accommodate claim, he must demonstrate that he needed an accommodation to perform the essential functions of his job.

The First Circuit then ruled that:

An employee who can, with some difficulty, perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation remains eligible to request and receive a reasonable accommodation.

This holding – that a disabled employee who can perform the essential functions of a job can nonetheless request and receive special accommodation so long as the employee faces “some difficulty” in performing those functions – can be expected to invite a flood of litigation.

The unfortunate reality is that many employees with disabilities face “some difficulty” in performing essential job functions. The Court in O’Reilly did not provide any guidance on when “some difficulty” rises to the level that it must be accommodated. This lack of guidance contrasts with the otherwise-settled principle that the duty to accommodate is triggered when the accommodation is necessary for the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. It can be expected that Plaintiff’s lawyers will seize upon the ambiguity of this new “some difficulty” standard. If you have questions or would like further information, please contact PLDO Partner Joel K. Goloskie and Attorney Randelle L. Boots at 401-824-5100 or email jgoloskie@pldolaw.com and rboots@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice

In July, the Massachusetts Appeal Court in Capobianco v. Dischino Capobianco v. Dischino, 19-P-197 (Mass. App. Ct. Jul. 9, 2020) ruled that a beneficiary forfeited his beneficial interest in a Trust established by his parents when he filed an action seeking to remove the successor Trustees and be appointed as sole Trustee. The Court held that the beneficiary, by bringing the action, violated the no-contest clause, which provided that any person who attempts to contest any provision of the Trust is deemed to have predeceased the settlors.

A no-contest clause is also known as an in terrorem clause, which is Latin for terrorize. As its name implies, if a beneficiary violates the no-contest clause, he/she will suffer the consequences set forth in the clause, which is often to forfeit his/her interest as a beneficiary.

The Court began its discussion by noting that no-contest clauses are narrowly construed because generally the law disfavors forfeitures. The Court pointed out, however, that the Trust instrument under consideration specifically prevented a beneficiary from serving as a sole Trustee. By bringing an action to remove the Trustees and to serve alone, he challenged the terms of the Trust and violated the no-contest clause. The Court notes that had the beneficiary been successful in removing the Trustees and appointing himself, the terms of the Trust regarding the succession of the Trustees would not have been carried out.

The case highlights the importance of taking great care when considering a challenge to a trustee’s actions. If the challenging party is a beneficiary and the trust contains a no-contest clause, the no-contest clause has to be reviewed carefully. In the Capobianco case, had the beneficiary sought an accounting or filed a petition seeking an interpretation of the instrument, approaches the Court noted were well within his rights, he would not have forfeited his interest. If you would like more information about this decision or need assistance with your estate and trust planning, please contact PLDO Partner Gene M. Carlino in Rhode Island at 401-824-5100 or in our Florida office at 561-362-2030 or email gcarlino@pldolaw.com.

 

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

 

 

Booking.com, an on-line travel agency that books hotel reservations and provides other services to customers, filed an application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) to register the trademark “Booking.com.” The application was rejected based on the well-established principle that generic terms are not subject to trade mark protection. The decision was appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which upheld the USPTO decision. Both found that “booking” was a generic term on its face and adding “.com” did not add any indication of the source of the services.

On appeal, the Federal District Court reversed the earlier decisions based upon all of the evidence presented, which included consumer surveys. The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed based on a finding that the public would associate the trademark “Booking.com” with the company that had filed the original application and not with online reservation services generally. The government appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Ruling

Among other issues, the USPTO argued that generic terms are never subject to trademark protection and the lower courts had placed too much weight on the perceptions of the public in determining whether Booking.com would indicate the source of the services being offered. However, in an 8 to 1 decision, the Supreme Court recently agreed with Booking.com. The Court acknowledged that all trademarks must distinguish the goods or services of one company from similar goods or services offered by other competing companies; and that in many cases combining one generic term with another would not satisfy that requirement.

However, in this case adding the “.com” suffix did provide that additional meaning, since only one company can use a particular domain name at any given time and a significant portion of the public would know that a domain name was exclusive to a specific company.

Some Practical Advice

This decision opens the door for companies that have generic names but also own a corresponding website domain name to obtain federal trademark protection that would not have been possible in the past. If you have questions about this issue or other business matters, please contact PLDO Partner William F. Miller at 508- 420-7159 or email wmiller@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

PLDO recently issued an advisory about the forthcoming explosion of lawsuits arising out of the coronavirus pandemic. Specifically, the article addressed the legal concept of “force majeure” and predicted that many businesses will claim that the pandemic prevented them from performing their contractual obligations, which is the thrust of force majeure – a party’s ability to be excused from performing their obligations in a contract based upon so-called “acts of God” or unforeseen circumstances.

The advisory author, PLDO Partner Brian J. Lamoureux’s prediction was on the mark as lawsuits have started winding their way through the courts. Many of these cases involve insurance disputes over coverage and losses, lawsuits between suppliers and buyers of raw material and products, and employment disputes among unions, employees, and employers over working conditions. Another particularly hot area for COVID-19 disputes is playing out in bankruptcy courts throughout the country. Indeed, we have seen the beginning of the end of many former blue-chip companies such as Hertz, Neiman Marcus, and JC Penney, to name a few. Although it is much too early to draw any firm conclusions about how all of this litigation will play out, a very recent bankruptcy decision out of Illinois provides an interesting insight into how courts might handle these difficult situations.

In his follow-up advisory, Attorney Lamoureux describes the Illinois case and offers three key takeaways for readers to consider, including the approach courts may take to resolve disputes caused by the pandemic crisis. To access the advisory, click on Courts Start to Weigh In on COVID-19 Lawsuits. For more information, please contact Attorney Lamoureux at 401-824-5100 or email bjl@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

Most employers know that they cannot insist that an employee take a drug test unless the employer has “reasonable grounds” to believe that an employee’s job performance is impaired by drug use. Also, the employer must observe contemporaneous evidence of impairment such as behavior or speech. It is not simply enough to have a hunch or a suspicion of drug use.

Last month, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld an employer’s firing of an employee who refused to submit to a drug test. In that case, the employee was a delivery driver who allegedly injured himself making a delivery. Unbeknownst to his employer, the driver also had a medical marijuana card due to pre-existing injuries. When the driver reported his injury to his manager, the driver was described as acting “weird” by his coworkers. Smartly, the manager enlisted the help of a fellow manager to observe and corroborate his version of events.

After the driver was fired, he sued his employer, claiming that his behavior was caused by the injury he suffered while making the delivery. Therefore, he claimed that his employer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was under the influence. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that, based upon the corroborated reports regarding the employee’s behavior, the employer had reasonable grounds to insist upon a drug test.

There are two key takeaways from this important case. First, it underscores how critical it is for managers to contemporaneously and competently chronicle their interactions with an impaired employee. Whenever possible and appropriate, managers should enlist the assistance of another “set of eyes” on the situation as a means of protecting everyone involved from rash conclusions or improper assumptions. Two sets of eyes are always better than one.

Second, the Supreme Court does not appear eager to second-guess employers’ decisions if employers can point to specific and articulated reasons justifying their insistence that an employee be drug tested. As long as those reasons are reasonable, courts will generally defer to the employer’s conclusions. And, although the Supreme Court did not focus on this employee’s holding of a medical marijuana card as an issue in this case, employers should continue to always tread carefully when confronting or disciplining employees who are suspected of impairment by legal or illegal drugs.

If you have questions or would like more information on this issue or other employment and business matters, please contact PLDO Partner Brian J. Lamoureux at 401-824-5100 or email bjl@pldolaw.com.

 

For employers determining what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation” can often be a challenge. A very recent decision by a federal court in Connecticut highlights the fact that what constitutes “reasonable” is not without limits, and an employer is not obligated to create new positions or allow employees to work without supervision. Wang v. HP, Inc., Civil No. 3:17-cv-2096 (D. Conn. 2020).

In Wang, the Plaintiff, who suffered from depression and anxiety, worked remotely from his Connecticut home for Defendant HP, Inc. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff was informed of a corporate initiative encouraging all remote employees to “return to the office,” even if it meant relocating. Plaintiff refused to relocate from Connecticut to Idaho, and later requested short-term disability leave, which was then extended to long-term disability leave because Plaintiff was “medically unable to perform the functions of his former position.” Plaintiff was ultimately terminated almost two years later because he was unable to find a vacant position for which he was qualified to fill at HP, Inc. Plaintiff then filed suit asserting that HP, Inc. violated the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by denying two separate requests for accommodation: (1) the first request being that he worked only twenty hours a week without contact with his former supervisor and colleagues, and (2) the second request providing a job assignment after he was approved to return to work thirty hours weekly.

A basic fact a plaintiff must prove in an ADA case is that an “effective accommodation exists” that would allow him to perform his job. The Court ruled that a request to change supervisors was unreasonable. The Court noted that the Plaintiff requested to “be employed in a setting, and workgroup in which he will have no day to day contact with former fellow employees and/or supervisors,” but Plaintiff offered no evidence that within the context of his particular workplace, this was a reasonable accommodation. In fact, this request would have essentially required the Defendant create a new position or allow Plaintiff to work without supervision which the Court held were not reasonable accommodations. For further information, please contact PLDO Principal William E. O’Gara at 401-824-5100 or email wogara@pldolaw.com.

The Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act (“EAJA”) is a legislative enactment whose purpose is to “mitigate the burden placed upon individuals and small businesses by the arbitrary and capricious decisions of administrative agencies made during adjudicatory proceedings, as defined in the act.” Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888, 892 (R.I. 1988). EAJA accomplishes this purpose by providing for an award of attorney’s fees and other reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing party. See G.L. 1956 § 42-92-3. This incentive seeks to eliminate the financial burden for those who are forced to defend against unjustified governmental action and seeks to deter the unreasonable exercise of governmental authority.

In a recent Superior Court decision, a non-party litigant sought to reap the benefits of EAJA. In that matter, Preston v. Town of Hopkinton et al., C.A. WC-2017-0470, the Plaintiff sought litigation expenses for her successful challenge of the decision of the Hopkinton Zoning Board that permitted her neighbor to keep alpacas on the neighbor’s property. The Plaintiff was not a party to the underlying decision of the Zoning Board, but rather, was able to challenge the decision as an “aggrieved party.” After obtaining a favorable ruling from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the Plaintiff argued that she was a prevailing party pursuant to EAJA and should be awarded her reasonable litigation expenses. The Superior Court disagreed, determining that EAJA is not applicable to non-parties, like the Plaintiff in this matter, because EAJA sought to protect those whom the government may “proceed against.” Plaintiff, the court determined, voluntarily “entered the arena” and thus, created a “scenario with which the Legislature was [not] concerned when it enacted the EAJA.” The ruling clarifies that EAJA is only applicable to parties whom the government brings an action against, and not parties who may intervene to protect their own interests. For further information on this decision or related legal issues, please contact Attorney Patrick J. McBurney at 401-824-5100 or email pmcburney@pldolaw.com.

In a recent Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, the Court summarily dismissed a residential tenant’s appeal due to the tenant’s failure to continue to pay rent during the pendency of the appeal. This requirement, which is set forth in section 34-18-52 of the Rhode Island General Laws, is often the downfall of a tenant’s appeal in either the Superior or Supreme Court.

The matter before the Court was Naughton v. Guilloteau et al., No. 2019-6-Appeal, where the plaintiff/landlord brought an eviction against the defendant/tenant in the District Court. The District Court entered judgment for the landlord, and the tenant appealed that decision to the Superior Court. After a hearing at the Superior Court, judgment once again entered for the landlord. Undeterred, the tenant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. However, while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the tenant failed to continue to pay rent to the landlord. Because of this failure, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This case highlights a critical, but oftentimes unknown, provision of the Rhode Island General Laws regarding landlord tenant disputes. That provision states that during the pendency of an appeal, whether residential (§ 34-18-52) or commercial (§ 34-18.1-18), the tenant must continue to pay rent to the landlord or else risk having judgment enter against them. Anyone that finds themselves embroiled in a landlord-tenant dispute needs to be mindful of this requirement. For further information on this issue, please contact Attorney Patrick J. McBurney at 401-824-5100 or email pmcburney@pldolaw.com.

 

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

States are now one step closer to holding the Sackler family individually liable for the role they and their pharmaceutical corporation, Purdue Pharma, played in creating and facilitating the nation’s opioid epidemic. In a decision issued on October 8, 2019, Massachusetts Superior Court Justice Janet L. Sanders denied a motion to dismiss individual claims against 17 individuals who worked at Purdue Pharma in high level positions or served on its Board of Directors, finding that “[t]he Commonwealth has met its burden of producing evidence showing that each of the named defendants participated in making or approving false representations, knowingly sent to Massachusetts with the intent that Massachusetts residents rely on those misrepresentations, resulting in injury to them.”

This decision comes as state agencies continue to be split on accepting a proposed settlement agreement with Purdue that would result in Purdue declaring bankruptcy and establishing a “public benefit trust” with its profits going toward settlement. It has been estimated that the fund could total $12 billion. 26 states, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island are on record as rejecting the deal, citing concerns that the settlement would not hold the Sackler family individually liable or accountable for their role in the opioid crisis that has claimed more than 400,000 lives in the U.S. since 2000.

Rhode Island Attorney General Peter F. Neronha defended his decision to reject the proposed settlement, stating that “[f]ar too many lives have been lost or devastated in Rhode Island as a result of the opioid crisis. We have not agreed to the proposed settlement framework with Purdue Pharma. Before we could responsibly reach any agreement, we would need much more information about the financial holdings of Purdue Pharma and the Sacklers to be confident that this resolution adequately compensates Rhode Island and, equally as important, holds the company and its owners accountable for the enormous destruction they have caused.”

Connecticut Attorney General William Tong echoed Neronha’s sentiments that the settlement agreement is insufficient. “Our position remains firm and unchanged. The scope and scale of the pain, death and destruction that Purdue and the Sacklers have caused far exceeds anything that has been offered thus far.”

For its part, Brown University has announced its plans to redirect more than $1 million in donations from the Sackler family, in light of the growing concerns that the pharmaceutical giant contributed to the nation’s opioid epidemic. University spokesman Brian E. Clark stated that Brown and representatives from The Sackler Foundation “have agreed to work toward redirecting this gift to one or more charitable organizations in Rhode Island in support of medicine-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder and opioid addiction research.”

The wave of litigation related to the opioid crisis continues to build, and can be expected to impact many entities and individuals as it does, from manufacturers and distributors to health care providers and pharmacies and beyond. Those seeking to understand the current status and potential direction of opioid litigation should contact PLDO Attorney Meagan L. Thomson at 401-824-5100 or mthomson@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

In N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on June 21, 2019 holding the State of North Carolina may not tax a beneficiary on the income of a trust merely because the beneficiary resides within its borders.  In Kaestner, an individual domiciled in New York formed a trust for the benefit of his children.  The trustee lived in Connecticut.  One of the beneficiaries moved to North Carolina and several years later the State assessed a tax of more than $1.3 Million dollars against the beneficiary under a law authorizing the State to tax any trust income that “is for the benefit of” a state resident.

In the victory for the taxpayer, the Court found the beneficiary had no right to, and did not receive, any income distributions from the trust during the years in question.  Under the terms of the trust the beneficiary had no right to demand trust income nor could she count on receiving any specific amount of income in the future.  The distributions from the trust were in the absolute and sole discretion of the trustee.  Further, the trustee maintained no physical presence in North Carolina, made no direct investments in the State, and held no real property there.

While the ruling of Kaestner is very narrow, if you are a trustee or a beneficiary of a trust that has been taxed simply based on residing in a particular state then you should contact your CPA to discuss filing refund claims for any open tax years.  This ruling also serves as a reminder to contact your estate planning attorney to review what you might do to improve a trust you have to strengthen a position that tax is not due in a particular state. If you need assistance or have questions about estate planning strategies and trusts, please contact PLDO estate and trust attorney Jason S. Palmisano at 561-362-2030 or email jpalmisano@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.

In a recent Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, the Court clarified the duty owed, or better yet not owed, by an insurer to third party claimants in auto accident matters. In Summit Insurance Company v. Eric Stricklett et al., No. 2017-185-A (R.I. 2019), a minor was struck by a vehicle and suffered serious injuries. The minor had to undergo several surgeries to repair various fractures. In doing so, the minor incurred medical bills of over $80,000. Unfortunately for the minor, the insurance policy limits of the striking driver, provided by Summit Insurance, were $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident.

While Summit initially denied the minor’s claim, alleging that its insured was not at fault, Summit eventually offered the minor the $25,000 policy limits. The minor rejected this offer and asserted that because Summit had previously failed to offer the policy limits, they believed that Summit would be responsible for damages above and beyond the limits in accordance with Asermely v. Allstate Insurance Company, 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999). In Asermely, the Court “promulgated a new rule,” which in Rhode Island has resulted in what is commonly referred to as an “Asermely Demand.” This new rule holds that if an insurer receives a reasonable written offer to settle a matter within the policy limits, and if the insurer declines to settle, then the insurer does so at its peril in the event that a trial results in a judgment that exceeds the policy limits. The obligation owed by the insurer runs to the insured and therefore, also to any party to whom the insured assigned their rights.

At issue in Summit was whether the obligation owed by the insurer also ran to third party claimants who had not had the insured’s rights assigned to them. The Court made abundantly clear that it has “never allowed a third party to bring a claim under Asermely without an assignment from the insured.” Moreover, the duty to act reasonably and in good faith in considering settlement offers only runs to the insured, which is why the assignment would be necessary if the third party wished to pursue such a claim. Accordingly, should one find themselves contemplating an Asermely style demand, it is important to make sure you are assigned the rights of the insured to be in a position to bring a lawsuit to recover pursuant to Asermely. For further information on this issue, please contact Attorney Patrick J. McBurney at 401-824-5100 or email pmcburney@pldolaw.com.

 

 

Disclaimer: This blog post is for informational purposes only. This blog is not legal advice and you should not use or rely on it as such. By reading this blog or our website, no attorney-client relationship is created. We do not provide legal advice to anyone except clients of the firm who have formally engaged us in writing to do so. This blog post may be considered attorney advertising in certain jurisdictions. The jurisdictions in which we practice license lawyers in the general practice of law, but do not license or certify any lawyer as an expert or specialist in any field of practice.